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Banking in California, 1878-1905: 
Some Evidence on Structure 
Lynne Pierson Dati 
An accurate portrayal of late-nineteenth-century U.S. financial history 
is necessary to provide material for testing theories of the role of finan-
cial institutions in economic development, growth, and business cycles. The 
few recent works on the behavior of financial institutions during this peri-
od have relied almost exclusively on data from the reports of the Comp-
troller of the Currency.l These reports do not include information on 
state banks. Since most of the banks existing in this period were state 
rather than federally chartered, a potentially significant bias has been in-
troduced into these studies. 
This essay explores the mobility of capital in California between 1878 
and 1905 using state banking data. The results indicate that changes in the 
California economy cannot be explained by obstacles to financial flows. The 
results also indicate the direction of bias in previous studies of financial 
history and provide access to statistics on California banking history. 
The 1965 article by Lance Davis is the most important study of U.S. 
banking in this period. Davis characterizes the late nineteenth century as 
a period during which barriers to the flow of financial capital between re-
gions decreased. His findings indicate that capital flows improved over 
time, although the Pacific coastal regions remained isolated from sources of 
funds even as late as 1914.2 
Richard Sylla also has written a widely accepted article on nineteenth-
century U.S. financial history. Sylla concluded that the federal government 
and provisions of the National Banking Act served to restrain the growth of 
the financial industry. Specifically, Sylla feels the tax on bank notes and 
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the requirements for m1n1mum levels of paid-up capital created a two-
tiered system. Banking in the cities was competitive, but rural bankers 
monopolized their local market. The situation caused the movement of capi-
tal from rural to urban areas, as rural bankers restricted local lending to 
keep interest rates high and deposited their excess funds in city banks.3 
In the present study, the first step was to handle the problem of in-
accessible data for state chartered banks. California statistics were col-
lected for six years, between 1878 and 1905, from the reports of the 
California Board of Bank Commissioners. For our purposes, the years corre-
sponding to population census data (1879, 1889, and 1899) were judged to 
have the most interest, and the data base was increased by adding 1884, 
1894, and 1905 (the 1904 report was not published). 
The most direct evidence on the structure of an industry is obtained 
by comparing the prices charged for a particular product. If no monopoly 
power exists, differences in the price will reflect only differences in the 
cost of producing the good. Differences in price caused by transportation 
cost, transaction costs, or risk are compatible with a competitive industry 
structure. In banking, the interest rate charged on loans and paid on de-
posits represents the price of the firm's product. Past studies of the bank-
ing industry have attempted to use the interest rate or estimates of it to 
test for competitive structure. 
Very little direct information on interest rates charged by U.S. lend-
ers is available for the late nineteenth century. The California Board of 
Bank Commissioners requested this information in only one year, 1879, and 
39 banks responded. Only one San Francisco bank was among the respondents, 
and the interest rate that bank charged is one of the lowest reported. It 
appears that interest rates increased with the distance from San Francisco, 
and a curious pattern emerges when the banks are grouped geographically (in 
northern, southern, or central California). Table 1 shows the interest 
rates reported in 1879. Most banks in any one segment of the state charged 
identical interest rates. 
Because 1879 is the only year for which interest charges are reported, 
other attempts were made to discern differences in interest rates among re-
gions. Most of the individual savings banks reported the interest they paid 
to their depositors every year. This information was collected for the 
three census years and for the three years midway between them. The mean 
interest paid on savings and on demand deposits was computed for each region, 
and the difference in the mean interest rates among areas was tested for 
significance. The results, shown in Table 2, revealed no consistent differ-
ences, and the scattered differences did not decrease in frequency over time. 
These results support neither the Sylla nor the Davis hypothesis. 
Differences are more frequently significant when a proxy for interest 
rates is used. The proxy developed by Davis and modified very slightly in 
this study is the ratio of gross earnings to earning assets. Calculation of 
this proxy for banks in California for the six selected years reveals scat-
tered significant differences among regions within the state. These differ-
ences disappear suddenly by 1905, providing some support for the contention 
that capital flows improved over time. (See Table 3.) 
An examination of the pattern of real estate lending also was made using 
the detailed information available in the Board of Bank Commissioners' reports. 
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Table 1. Interest Charged on Loans in 1879 by California Commercial Banks 
Percent 
Bank per month 
San Francisco 
Wells Fargo & Co. 
Northern counties 
Bank of Chico 
Citizen's Bank, Nevada City 
Colusa County Bank, Colusa 
Farmer's Savings Bank, Lakeport 
Humboldt County Bank, Eureka 
Mendocino Discount Bank 
Bank of Napa 
Bank of Tehama, Red Bluff 
Bank of Woodland 
Central counties 
Bank of Dixon 
Farmers & Mechanics Bank, Heraldsburg 
Bank of Fresno 
Bank of Gilroy 
Bank of Heraldsburg 
Bank of Hollister 
Bank of Martinez 
Petaluma Savings Bank 
Sacramento Bank 
Salinas City Bank 
Bank of Santa Cruz County 
Santa Rosa Bank 
Bank of Santa Rosa 
Sanoma Valley Bank 
Bank of Suisun 
Bank of Tomales 
Bank of Vallejo 
Bank of Visalia 
Southern counties 
Bank of Anaheim 
Commercial Bank of San Diego 
Commercial Bank of Los Angeles 
Farmers & Nerchants Bank, Los Angeles 
Kern Valley Bank, Bakersfield 
Santa Barbara County Bank 
Bank of San Diego 
Bank of San Luis Obispo 







































30 BankinR in California 
Table 2. Differences in Mean Interest Rates Paid on Deposits in California, 
1879-1905 
Test 
Between rural areas 
North versus central 
North versus south 
South versus central 




Between urban and rural 
San Francisco Bay area 
versus other counties 
All other counties versus 
San Francisco 
Between rural areas 
North versus central 
North versus south 
South versus central 




Between urban and rural 
San Francisco Bay area 
versus other counties 












































































































Each bank or savings bank reported its total amount of loans on real estate 
in each county in the state. Collection and processing of this information 
for the six selected years allowed the reconstruction of lending and capital 
flows. The data reveal several trends in the market. 
In the late nineteenth century, most California banks participated in 
real estate lending. Savings banks committed a large percentage of their 
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Table 3. Differences in Mean Gross Earnings/Earning Assets in California, 
1879-1905 
Test 1879 1884 1889 1894 1898 1905 
North versus central 0 0 0 0 
North versus south 0 0 * 0 Central versus south 0 * 0 * * San Francisco versus north 0 0 0 0 
San Francisco versus central 0 
* * * 0 San Francisco versus south 0 * * 0 0 
San Francisco versus all others 0 0 * * * 0 
- : Insufficient data, 
0 Difference not significant, 
* : Difference significant at the 90 percent level of confidence. 
assets to real estate loans, but the larger resources of the commercial 
banks made them an equally important loan source. Private and foreign banks 
participated in real estate lending less frequently. 
There is little support for the contention that banks were prevented by 
transaction or information costs from lending outside their immediate neigh-
borhoods. Most California counties encompass a large geographical area, and 
banks loaned outside their home county with great frequency. Even as early 
as 1878, 67 percent of the banks were lending outside their home territory, 
and 30 percent listed real estate loans in at least five different counties. 
The data rather conclusively dispel the image of the rural banker limited to 
allocating his funds between the local farmers and the big city banks. (See 
Table 4.) 
The data do not, however, support the contention that the market im-
proved over time. Lending to other counties should increase as developments 
in transportation and communication facilitate loans on distant property. 
Except for 1889 and 1905, the percentage of banks lending in only the home 
county remains constant. In 1905, more banks loaned in only one county, al-
though the percentage drops if the newer banks in the very large southern 
counties are excluded. This indicates increased self-sufficiency of coun-
ties rather than increased lending among areas. 
The number of banks in each region has often been used as a measure of 
monopoly power.4 In this study, the number of banks making real estate 
loans on property in each county was determined from the reports of the 
banks. It is apparent that Californians were not restricted to borrowing 
from the neighborhood bank. Although many counties had only one bank, few 
counties show loans on real estate from only one source (see Table 5). The 
estimated number of loans originating from outside the county ranged from 
71.6 percent to 82.1 percent of the total number of loans estimated for the 
six sample years between 1878 and 1905. (See Table 6.) 
Although the percentage of the total loan funds from banks outside the 
county is uniformly lower than the percentage of lenders, it is also consis-
tently significant. The average percentage of loan funds reported as or1g1-
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Table 4. Real Estate Lending by California Banks According to Number of 
Counties, 1878-1905 
Number of banks reporting loans in 
1 2 3 4-10 ll-20 More than 20 
Year county counties counties counties counties counties 
1878 26 17 6 22 6 3 
(33%) 
1884 28 12 21 20 7 0 
(32%) 
1889 81 31 14 31 9 4 
(48%) 
1894 94 51 39 50 14 6 
(37%) 
1899 79 56 34 52 10 0 
(34%) 
1905 159 78 32 62 8 4 
(46%) 
1905 
(without ( 40%) 
southern 
counties) 
six-year sample. Most counties received more than 50 percent of their funds 
from banks in other counties. (See Table 7.) 
The study of intracounty real estate lending does not reveal a pattern 
consistent with the Sylla model. Rural bankers could not maintain monopoly 
power against this large amount of lending from banks in other parts of the 
state, and, at least in real estate lending, capital funds seem to have moved 
chiefly from urban to rural areas, rather than the reverse. The study of 
real estate lending also reveals the danger of using traditional measures of 
bank concentration, which assume that lending sources are limited to local 
banks. 
Other tests also cast doubt on the appropriateness of the Sylla model 
for California. It does not appear that California state banks were kept 
from joining the national banking system by the high capital requirements, 
for 80 percent of the state banks would have been able to meet them in 1879. 
Sylla theorizes that the mechanism for channeling funds from rural to urban 
.. 
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Table 5. California Counties with Only One Real Estate Lending Source, 
1878-1905 
1878 1884 1889 1894 1899 1905 
8 7 4 2 1 3 
(15.4%) (13. 5%) (7. 5%) (3. 5%) (1.8%) (5.3%) 
Table 6. Average Percentage of Lenders Located Outside County, 1878-1905 
1878 1884 1889 1894 1899 1905 
82.1% 73.5% 71.0% 74.3% 76.8% 71.6% 
Table 7. California Counties Receiving More Than Half Their Real Estate 
Loan Funds from Outside the County, 1878-1905 
1878 1884 1889 1894 1899 1905 
69.8% 67.4% 61.7% 63.5% 78.8% 49.1% 
areas is the rural banker's deposit in city banks, and he predicts that 
rural as opposed to urban bankers would have held a larger percentage of 
their assets in the form of deposits at other banks,5 In California, the 
balance statement item "funds due from other bankers" as a percentage of 
total assets is virtually identical for urban and rural banks in 1889 and 
1899. 
If the rural areas were characterized by monopolist bankers, and if 
competitive conditions existed in urban areas, then rural bankers should 
show a higher level of profit than their urban counterparts. An estimated 
profit margin can be determined by comparing the interest received on loans 
with the interest paid on deposits. In 1889, 23 savings banks supplied in-
formation sufficient to estimate profit margins. The interest received on 
loans was estimated for each bank by dividing gross earnings by earning 
assets. The average rate of interest paid on deposits was calculated from 
information supplied by the banks. The difference between the interest on 
loans proxy and the interest paid is the gross profit margin. These gross 
profit margins were grouped by bank location, and average profit margins of 
33 
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the groups were compared. For 1889, there were no significant differences. 
(See Table 8.) 
The tests were repeated with data reported by savings banks in 1899. 
With the increased number of banks reporting that year, 50 profit margins 
were calculated. Comparison of profit in the reputedly most competitive 
area, San Francisco, with the remainder of the state reveals higher profit 
rates in rural areas, but the difference is not significant at the 90 per-
cent level of confidence. When the definition of urban areas is broadened 
to include Los Angeles, and then Oakland and Alameda, the differences become 
significant. When Los Angeles is compared with the rural banks in Southern 
California, the differences in mean profit rates are not significant. 
These comparisons among regions reveal differences significant to the 
monopoly hypothesis only if the costs of servicing loans and deposit accounts 
are similar in urban and rural areas; there is strong indication that this is 
not the case. Banks may have economies of scale for both the size of loans 
and deposit accounts. No information exists on loan size, but in 1899 banks 
reported the average deposit per account. It is evident that urban banks had 
higher average deposits than did rural ones. Comparison of the average, by 
area, of the reported deposit sizes reveals significantly larger deposits in 
the urban areas, which had lower gross profit margins. (See Table 9.) There-
fore, the apparent differences in gross profit could have been caused by dif-
ferences in cost and do not necessarily support the hypothesis of rural monop-
olies. 
This study adds little support to Davis's hypothesized improvement in the 
capital market during the late nineteenth century. An improvement would be 
indicated by declining differences in interest rates throughout the state and 
by increased capital flows to areas in which interest rates are higher. This 
study of California does not indicate a trend of this type. There is some 
hint of a decline in interest rate differentials when the Davis proxy is used, 
Table 8. Difference in Mean of Average Profit Margins for California Banks, 
1889 and 1899 
Groups compared 
San Francisco versus all other 
San Francisco and Los Angeles versus 
all other 
Bay Area plus Los Angeles versus all 
othera 











* : Difference significant at the 90 percent level of confidence. 
aBay Area includes San Francisco, Oakland, and Alameda. 
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Table 9. Difference in Mean of Average Deposits in California, 1899 
Groups compared t value 
San Francisco versus all other *4.95 
San Francisco and Los Angeles versus all other *3.25 
Bay Area and Los Angeles versus all othera *3.34 
Los Angeles versus other Southern California *1.96 
* : Difference significant at the 90 percent level of confidence. 
asay Area includes San Francisco, Oakland, and Alameda. 
but the trend is not revealed in differences in interest paid to depositors. 
The real estate study does not indicate increasing mobility of capital. 
Funds flowed throughout the state with comparative ease in all years studied. 
Although the tests do not disprove the Sylla model, they do raise some 
strong doubt about its validity. When combined with other works also criti-
cal of Sylla,6 the results discussed here can be seen as part of a growing 
body of evidence against the accuracy of Sylla's portrayal of the U.S. fi-
nancial structure in the late nineteenth century. 
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